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READING DEBOER AND OBERGEFELL 
THROUGH THE “MORAL READINGS 
VERSUS ORIGINALISMS” DEBATE: FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL “EMPTY CUPBOARDS” 
TO EVOLVING UNDERSTANDINGS 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By 
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University 
Press. 2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth). 
Linda C. McClain2 
Original meaning. . . . When two individuals sign a 
contract to sell a house, no one thinks that, years 
down the road, one party to the contract may change 
the terms of the deal. That is why the parties put the 
agreement in writing and signed it publicly – to prevent 
changed perceptions and needs from changing the 
guarantees in the agreement. So it normally goes with 
the Constitution: The written charter cements the 
limitations on government into an unbending bulwark, 
not a vane alterable whenever alterations occur – 
unless and until the people, like contracting parties, 
 
 1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished 
Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 2. Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston 
University School of Law; Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow, 
University Center for Human Values, Princeton University. This essay is a 
revised version of a paper prepared for the conference, “Law and 
Constitutional Interpretation: Moral Readings versus Originalisms,” held at 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) on February 16-17, 2015, 
in Mexico City. My thanks to Imer Flores for inviting me to participate in that 
conference and to participants for helpful comments. The analysis in Part III 
draws upon my portion of the Constitution Day Lecture that James E. Fleming 
and I delivered at University of Missouri (Columbia) on September 17, 2015. 
My research assistants Gina Del Rio Gazzo and Samantha Maurer provided 
valuable help on this project. Thanks also to James Fleming for comments. A 
Boston University summer research grant supported this project. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961386 
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choose to change the contract through the agreed-
upon mechanisms for doing so [Article V]. 
. . . Applied here, this approach permits today’s 
marriage laws to stand until the democratic processes 
say they should stand no more. From the founding of 
the Republic to 2003, every State defined marriage 
as a relationship between a man and a woman, 
meaning that the Fourteenth Amendment permits, 
though it does not require, States to define marriage 
in that way. 
—DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 403-04 (6th Cir. 
2014) (Sutton, Jeffrey, Circuit Judge) 
The majority’s “original meaning” analysis . . . can tell 
us little about the Fourteenth Amendment, except to 
assure us that “the people who adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment [never] understood it to 
require the States to change the definition of 
marriage.” The quick answer is that they undoubtedly 
did not understand that it would also require school 
desegregation in 1955 or the end of miscegenation 
laws across the country, beginning in California in 
1948 and culminating in the Loving decision in 1967 
. . . . 
Moreover, . . . [t]here is not now and never has been 
a universally accepted definition of marriage. . . When 
Justice Alito noted in Windsor that the opponents of 
DOMA were “implicitly ask[ing] us to endorse [a more 
expansive definition of marriage and] to reject the 
traditional view, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, 
J., dissenting), he may have been unfamiliar with all 
that the “traditional view” entailed, especially for 
women who were subjected to coverture as a result of 
Anglo-American common law. Fourteenth Amendment 
cases decided by the Supreme Court in the years 
since 1971 that “invalidat[ed] various laws and 
policies that categorized by sex have been part of a 
transformation that has altered the very institution at 
the heart of this case, marriage.” Latta [v. Otter], 771 
F.3d 456, 487 [9th Cir. 2014] (Berzon, J., 
concurring). 
—DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d at 431-32 (Daughtrey, 
Martha Craig, Circuit Judge, dissenting) 
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History really matters in Obergefell v. Hodges . . . 
History, like the Constitution, can be read in more than 
one way. 
—Nancy F. Cott, Which History in Obergefell v. Hodges?, 
PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORY (July 2015) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What’s in a name? Why do labels such as “moral 
reader” or “originalist” matter? The title of the 
conference that generated this published symposium 
suggests one context in which such labels matter: 
constitutional interpretation.3 We must consider the 
merits, it implies, of two approaches in evident tension 
with each other: “moral readings versus originalisms.” 
As the judicial statements quoted above indicate, this 
interpretive choice mattered for a practical and 
momentous constitutional controversy that recently 
riveted the attention of scholars, judges, legislators, and 
the public: what would the United States Supreme Court 
do when it considered DeBoer v. Snyder,4 the Sixth 
Circuit case in which Judge Sutton’s majority opinion 
created a circuit split—disagreeing with the Fourth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—by upholding 
statutes and constitutional amendments in four states 
(Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) that 
excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage and 
barred recognition of their valid out-of-state marriages. 
On January 16, 2015, the Supreme Court granted the 
petition for certiorari in that case. Amicus curiae (friends 
of the court) filed a record number (147) of amicus 
curiae briefs in the case,5 proffering many different 
 
 3. The conference, held at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México on 
February 16-17, 2015, was entitled “Law and Constitutional Interpretation: 
Moral Readings versus Originalisms.” 
 4. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing lower 
federal court rulings that the state statutes and constitutional amendments in 
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee violated the Due Process and/or 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). DeBoer was 
overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 5. Adam Liptak, Want to Be the Court’s Friend? It’s a Lot of Work, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2016, at A18 (reporting on statistics kept by Anthony J. Franze 
and R. Reeves Anderson, lawyers at Arnold & Porter). The party and amicus 
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constitutional pathways to reversing or affirming the 
Sixth Circuit. On June 26, 2015, in Obergerfell v. 
Hodges, the Court did reverse, issuing its landmark 
holding that “same-sex couples may exercise the 
fundamental right to marry” and that the state laws at 
issue were invalid “to the extent they exclude same-sex 
couples from civil marriage on the same terms and 
conditions as opposite-sex couples.”6 
As historian Nancy Cott observed, “history really 
matter[ed]” in Justice Kennedy’s landmark majority 
opinion, specifically, the history of the institution of 
marriage and how it has “changed over time to admit new 
understandings of liberty and equality” as well as “the 
history of condemnation and criminalization of same-sex 
intimacy until recent decades.”7 History also mattered in 
the various dissenting opinions, for, as Cott observed, 
“more than one version of the history of marriage [was] 
operating.”8 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that 
marriage is an “‘unvarying social institution’”9 and 
invoked the “singular understanding of marriage [that] 
has prevailed in the United States throughout our 
history.”10 Dissenting Justice Scalia insisted that “the 
People’s understanding”—“when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868”—that states did and 
could (constitutionally) limit marriage to one man and one 
woman “resolves these cases.”11 
In this essay, I will argue that Justice Kennedy’s 
landmark majority opinion in Obergefell crucially 
deployed two forms of evolving understanding—of 
constitutional guarantees of equality and the “promise of 
 
briefs are available at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/obergefell-v-hodges/. 
 6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605. 
 7. Nancy F. Cott, Which History in Obergefell v. Hodges?, PERSPECTIVES 
ON HISTORY (Summer 2015), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-
directories/perspectives-on-history/summer-2015/which-history-in-
obergefell-v-hodges (describing role played in majority opinion by friends of 
the court briefs filed by historians). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 2613. 
 11. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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liberty” as well as of the institution of marriage. Those 
two forms of evolution worked together in his opinion to 
reject a static notion either of the fundamental right to 
marry or of marriage itself. This approach to 
constitutional reasoning exemplifies the “moral reading” 
approach articulated in James E. Fleming’s recent book, 
Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral 
Readings and Against Originalism. As Fleming explains: 
“Moral readers accept our responsibility not to retreat 
from interpreting the Constitution so as to fulfill the 
promise of our commitments to abstract aspirational 
principles such as liberty and equality—not to retreat to 
originalism” (p. 191). Such an approach, evident in 
Justice Kennedy’s prior landmark LGBT rights decisions, 
such as Lawrence v. Texas,12 stresses the role of 
“insight” and of generational progress in coming to see 
“that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact 
serve only to oppress.”13 In Obergefell, as elaborated 
below, two such examples concern the repudiation of the 
laws of coverture and sex-based classifications 
perpetuating gender hierarchy within marriage and of 
laws barring interracial marriage. 
Previewing the interpretive battle between the 
Obergefell majority and the dissents (but with the sides 
reversed), in DeBoer v. Snyder Judge Sutton (writing the 
majority opinion) and Judge Daughtrey (in dissent) took 
sharply contrasting views of the relevance of “original 
meaning” with respect to the definition of marriage and 
the Fourteenth Amendment. These two judges’ 
contrasting approaches to marriage—whether universal 
and (until recently) unchanging or evolving in light of 
constitutional norms of equality—are of particular 
interest for the evident conflict between moral readings 
and originalisms. Judge Sutton’s analysis of “original 
meaning,” for example, drew critiques by some legal 
scholars, who contended that there were originalist 
arguments for same-sex marriage, such as a “principles-
based originalism” that “leaves room for the possibility 
that we may learn from experience and systematic study 
 
 12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 13. Id. at 578–79 (quoted by Fleming at pp. 59, 191).  
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that laws once thought necessary and proper serve only 
to needlessly oppress.”14 Indeed, two groups of 
prominent legal scholars filed amicus briefs in Obergefell 
enlisting the “original meaning” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to oppose the restrictive marriage laws at 
issue,15 spurring other originalist scholars to file an 
amicus brief contesting this approach to defining 
“original meaning” as pushing the term “originalist” so 
far that it “ceases to have any real meaning at all.”16 
Fleming’s book went to press prior to Obergefell, but 
he noted the rise of “new” or “inclusive” originalist 
arguments for same-sex marriage, some growing out of 
new originalist justification for the Court’s sex equality 
precedents (pp. 16-19).17 He argued, however, that by 
“conceiving the relevant original meaning abstractly, 
rather than specifically,” and by making arguments 
“about the evolving meaning” of commitment to 
“abstract evolving principles,” such originalists “are 
engaging in moral readings,” but without acknowledging 
that they are doing so (pp. 18-19). This is a persuasive 
point, and at least some originalists would agree.18 
Perhaps these new originalists should join the moral 
reading big tent (as Fleming proposes (p. 96)), rather 
 
 14. Dale Carpenter, Inverted Equal Protection: Same-Sex Marriage at the 
Sixth Circuit (Part 1, Originalism), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 14, 2014) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/11/14/inverted-equal-protection-same-sex-marriage-at-
the-sixth-circuit-part-I/.  
 15. Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Inst., William N. Eskridge Jr., and Steven 
Calabresi in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (Nos. 14–556, -562, -571, -574) [hereinafter Cato Institute Brief]; 
Brief Amicus Curiae of Legal Scholars Stephen Clark, Andrew Koppelman, 
Sanford Levinson, Irina Manta, Erin Shelley and Ilya Somin, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14–556, -562, -571, -574) 
[hereinafter Legal Scholars Brief]. 
 16. Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Originalism in Support of 
Respondents at 16, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14–
556, -562, -571, -574) [hereinafter Scholars of Originalism Brief].  
 17. See also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
2349, 2383 n. 192 (2015) (noting that “many originalists did suggest that 
there were plausible originalist arguments in favor of the claimants’ position” 
in Obergefell and listing examples).  
 18. See, e.g., Scholars of Originalism Brief, supra note 16, at 15–16 and 
discussion infra Part III. 
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than recruit others to a new, “inclusive” originalist big 
tent.19 My primary interest in this essay, however, is not 
to adjudicate whether the new originalism is a defensible 
form of originalism, but instead to examine the 
respective roles of moral readings and originalism in 
DeBoer and then Obergefell. It is telling that (1) none of 
the conservative Justices—all of whom dissented—
embraced the new originalism in Obergefell, and that (2) 
although “meaning” and “understanding” feature 
centrally in Kennedy’s majority opinion, they have less to 
do with fixed or “original” meaning or understanding than 
with evolving meaning and new understandings of 
constitutional guarantees and principles. An analysis of 
Obergefell (and, more broadly, the recent marriage 
equality litigation leading up to it) suggests that moral 
readings of the Constitution have played a significant role 
in making it less of (in Justice Ginsburg’s words) an 
“empty cupboard” for gay men and lesbians, just as they 
have played a role in making it less empty in the context 
of sex equality claims.20 As the Court’s gender revolution 
in interpreting Equal Protection was unfolding, Ginsburg 
(then a pioneering litigator and scholar) insisted that: 
“Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from 
the original understanding, is required to tie to the 
fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause a 
command that government treat men and women as 
individuals equal in rights, responsibilities, and 
opportunities.”21 Not surprisingly, in light of the long 
history of “empty-cupboard” jurisprudence and, for 
much of U.S. history, the absence of sex equality from 
 
 19. Baude articulates an “inclusive originalism” and further contends that 
it is “our law,” in terms of current constitutional practices. See Baude, supra 
note 17. For Fleming’s critique of Baude, see pp. 15-19.  
 20. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal 
Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 164. 
 21. Id. at 161. Some newer strands of originalism challenge Ginsburg’s 
argument by advancing an account of “fidelity to the original public meaning” 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, under which reading that amendment’s “anti-
caste principle” in light of the Nineteenth Amendment leads “inexorably to the 
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits sex discrimination.” See 
Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 46 (2011) (drawing on Reva Siegel, She the People: The 
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 947 (2002)). 
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the “constitutional canon,”22 feminist scholars are 
generally not among the ranks of originalists.23 
Nonetheless, even if the interpretive and historical 
projects in which new originalists are engaging may 
strain the label of “originalism,” and may be better cast 
as forms of a moral reading of the Constitution, they are 
valuable in encouraging critical reflection upon how and 
why sex discrimination and sexual orientation 
discrimination were part of the historical practices in the 
United States but are now recognizably inconsistent with 
our constitutional commitments and aspirational 
principles. 
In Part II, I analyze the majority and dissenting 
opinions in DeBoer, focusing on their competing 
approaches to the relevance of “original meaning” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and to the definition and history 
of marriage. I argue that the dissent offers a more 
persuasive approach, in stressing the transformation of 
marriage and gradual elimination of discriminatory 
marriage laws. In characterizing this as a moral reading, 
I also highlight the role that a moral reading played in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,24 the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ pathbreaking 
opinion interpreting the Massachusetts constitution to 
require extending civil marriage to same-sex couples, 
which (as I elaborate in Part III) serves as a template for 
Obergefell. Part III first discusses new originalist 
arguments made in amicus briefs urging reversal of the 
Sixth Circuit, and counterarguments made in briefs 
challenging such use of originalism. I then observe the 
evident rejection of such new originalist approaches in 
the four dissents in Obergefell, which instead appealed 
 
 22. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional 
Canon, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1715. 
 23. Notably, Mary Anne Case, who propounds a “feminist 
fundamentalism” theory of constitutional interpretation, reports that she had 
not given much thought to originalism until she “accepted the invitation from 
the Federalist Society to appear as the only woman with a speaking part” in 
their national symposium, Originalism 2.0. Mary Anne Case, The Ladies? 
Forget About Them. A Feminist Perspective on the Limits of Originalism, 29 
CONST. COMM. 431 (2014). 
 24. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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to original meaning and understanding to conclude that 
state marriage laws survived challenge under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. I argue that Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, is best understood as offering a 
moral reading of the Constitution. Twin forms of 
evolution – of understanding constitutional guarantees 
and of the institution of marriage – animate his opinion. 
I argue that the similar treatment of those twin forms of 
evolution in Goodridge provided a template for 
Kennedy’s opinion, as well as for his rejection of a 
narrow originalism that focuses on historical practices or 
original intent. History, for Kennedy (aided by friends of 
the court briefs filed by historians), was the beginning 
but not the end of the matter. In Part IV, I conclude. 
II. DEBOER V. SNYDER: “ORIGINAL MEANING” OR 
TRANSFORMATION OF “TRADITION”? 
In his majority opinion in DeBoer v. Snyder, Judge 
Sutton begins and ends with propositions about how 
“change” should occur “under the United States 
Constitution,” contending that changing the definition of 
marriage to include same-sex couples should be left to 
“state democratic processes” rather than to federal 
judges.25 I focus here on how forms of originalism shape 
Sutton’s opinion, contrasting it with the dissenting Judge 
Daughtrey’s emphatic rejection of such originalism. 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION: “ORIGINAL MEANING” FORBIDS A 
CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
“Original meaning” features in the majority’s 
approach both to interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment and to affirming the “traditional definition of 
marriage.” Subsequently, as discussed in Part III, some 
of the Obergefell dissents would embrace similar 
approaches. As is evident in the passage quoted at the 
beginning of this essay, Judge Sutton contends that the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was laid 
down at its ratification. Far from there being (to use 
 
 25. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014); see id. at 
420 (“This case ultimately presents two ways to think about change.”). 
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terms in Fleming’s book) a “construction zone” or any 
appropriate “building out” of constitutional principles 
such as liberty or equality (pp. 33, 139-40), the 
“originally understood meaning” is instead an 
“unbending bulwark;” indeed, the “written charter 
cements” limits on government.26 It is not a weather 
“vane,” “alterable whenever alterations occur.”27 In 
other words, by contrast to certain forms of new 
originalism, there should be no “updating” in 
interpreting or applying “fixed” constitutional provisions 
(or principles) in light of new facts or changing social 
understandings.28 
Sutton acknowledges that the “line between 
interpretation and evolution” in determining the “original 
meaning” of a constitutional provision “blurs from time 
to time”; after all, “the Fourteenth Amendment is old; 
the people ratified it in 1868,” and “it is generally 
worded.”29 Nonetheless: “Nobody in this case . . . 
argues that the people who adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment understood it to require the States to 
change the definition of marriage.”30 Instead, Sutton 
continues by appealing to “tradition,” noting the 
continuity in the definition of marriage in the states 
“[f]rom the founding of the Republic to 2003”31 (the 
year of Goodridge). Consistent with this static view of 
traditional marriage, it is Washington v. Glucksberg that 
Sutton enlists in support of “the import of original 
 
 26. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 403. 
 27. Id. 
 28. By contrast to Judge Sutton, for example, Ilya Somin, who advances 
a sex discrimination argument for marriage equality, argues that originalist 
methodology is “entirely consistent with updating the application of [the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s] fixed principles in light of new factual information,” 
and such updating is “not only permitted but actually required by the theory.” 
Ilya Somin, William Eskridge on Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/01/23/william-eskridge-on-originalism-and-same-sex-
marriage/. 
 29. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 403. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 404. 
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meaning in legal debates.”32 Strikingly absent here, as 
the dissent points out, is any attention to the tension 
between original meaning and the role of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the subsequent transformation of certain 
features of marriage present in 1868 – such as 
coverture and antimiscegenation laws. 
The majority opinion sounds a theme familiar both 
from state and federal constitutional litigation over 
marriage equality and from legislative arguments in favor 
of constitutional amendments: until 2004, when due to 
Goodridge, marriage became available to same-sex 
couples in Massachusetts, marriage had a fixed and 
shared meaning. Not only does that meaning of marriage 
as “between a man and a woman” date back to “the 
founding,”33 Judge Sutton argues, it dates back 
“thousands of years.”34 Accepting as a rational basis for 
state marriage bans that states “might wish to wait and 
see before changing a norm that our society (like all 
others) has accepted for centuries,” he contrasts the 
comparatively shorter time line of the experiment with 
same-sex marriage: 
The fair question is whether in 2004, one year after 
Goodridge, Michigan voters could stand by the 
traditional definition of marriage. How can we say that 
the voters acted irrationally for sticking with the seen 
benefits of thousands of years of adherence to the 
traditional definition of marriage in the face of one year 
of experience with a new definition of marriage. . . . A 
Burkean sense of caution does not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, least of all when measured by 
a timeline less than a dozen years long . . . .35 
Sutton asserts: “A dose of humility makes us 
hesitant to condemn as unconstitutionally irrational a 
view of marriage shared not long ago by every society in 
the world, shared by most, if not all, of our ancestors, 
 
 32. Id. at 403 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–19 
(1997)). 
 33. Id. at 404. 
 34. Id. at 406. 
 35. Id. 
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and shared still today by a significant number of the 
States.”36 
That view of marriage is, in effect, the by-now 
familiar “responsible procreation” or channelling 
argument offered as a rational basis for state marriage 
definitions that exclude same-sex couples. Although, in 
post-Windsor constitutional litigation, the other four 
circuit courts had rejected the responsible procreation 
argument, as does Judge Daughtrey in her dissent, Judge 
Sutton concludes it is one possible rational basis for the 
state laws under challenge. State marriage laws make 
sense, he asserts, if one starts with the premise that 
“governments got into . . . and remain in the business of 
defining marriage, not to regulate love but to regulate 
sex, most especially the intended and unintended effects 
of male-female intercourse,” and to ensure parental 
investment in and commitment to “the natural effects of 
male-female intercourse: children.”37 Notably, he finds 
that “[i]t is not society’s laws or . . . any one religion’s 
laws, but nature’s laws (that men and women 
complement each other biologically), that created the 
policy imperative” for marriage and, thus, “governments 
typically are not second-guessed under the Constitution 
for prioritizing how they tackle such issues.”38 
Sutton’s account of the familiar “channelling” 
argument about the origins of marriage appeals to 
history and nature, specifically, to assumed factual 
premises about the two sexes and gender 
complementarity. On this account, the state may 
rationally restrict marriage only to heterosexuals 
because only they may accidentally or unintentionally 
procreate and, thus, they particularly need the 
inducement of the many benefits linked to marriage to 
anchor their commitment to the children their sexual 
relations may produce. In contemporary marriage 
equality litigation, an early articulation of this channelling 
argument featured in Justice Cordy’s dissent in 
 
 36. Id. at 404.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 405. 
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Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.39 It also 
features in Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell 
(as discussed in Part III, below). Cordy advances, as I 
elaborate in other work, a conception of marriage as a 
social institution designed to solve a problem presented 
by nature, or evolution.40 Cordy drew on James Q. 
Wilson’s The Marriage Problem (also cited by Roberts), 
which identified that evolutionary problem as the sexual 
and reproductive asymmetry of men and women in the 
state of nature and the need for a mechanism to anchor 
men to women and to children.41 Even on the terms of 
this single purpose, a historical account of marriage, 
Judge Sutton fails to explain the logic of how excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage advances state 
purposes.42 
Finally, the majority opinion’s reliance on some form 
of originalism and rejection of a moral reading is also 
evident in its emphatic rejection of what it calls an 
“evolving meaning” approach to constitutional 
interpretation, which it understands to entail looking at 
“evolving moral and policy considerations.”43 Quoting 
the landmark sex equality case, United States v. Virginia, 
Judge Sutton acknowledges a conception of 
constitutional interpretation that moves toward better 
realization of aspirational principles: “‘A prime part of 
the history of our Constitution . . . is the story of the 
extension of constitutional rights . . . to people once 
ignored or excluded.’”44 He observes that the Court has 
 
 39. 798 N.E.2d 941, 983, 995–96 (Cordy, J, dissenting). 
 40. I have written about the channelling function and its role in marriage 
equality litigation in Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: 
Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 
(2007). 
 41. 798 N.E.2d at 995-96 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE 
PROBLEM 23-32 (2002)); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613 
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Wilson). For analysis of Wilson and 
the role his work has played in marriage equality litigation, see Linda C. 
McClain, James Q. Wilsons’s–and Society’s–Marriage Problem, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2511229. 
 42. My aim here is not to criticize this argument, which, as I point out 
infra, Daughtrey does effectively, enlisting Judge Posner’s trenchant critique 
in Baskin v. Bogan.  
 43. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 416. 
 44. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996)).  
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looked to “evolving moral and policy considerations 
before,” so “Why not do so here?”45 His answer is a 
curious account of constitutional evolution and “living 
constitutionalism.” To wit: “a principled jurisprudence of 
constitutional evolution turns on evolution in society’s 
values, not evolution in judges’ values”;46 while “every 
generation has the right to govern itself,” this means that 
until society has “ moved past” certain principles, judges 
must not “anticipat[e] principles that society has yet to 
embrace.”47 This conception of “living constitutionalism” 
entails that courts should not get ahead of “democratic 
majorities,” who should be given judicial deference in 
“deciding within reasonable bounds when and whether to 
embrace an evolving, as opposed to settled, societal 
norm.”48 The court distinguishes Lawrence, where only 
a minority of states still had anti-sodomy laws, from the 
instant case, in which over thirty states would still bar 
same-sex marriage but for “federal-court 
intervention.”49 Rather than seeking vindication through 
“creation of a new constitutional right” as a way to 
remedy the “loss of . . . dignity and respect,” plaintiffs, 
Judge Sutton argues, should turn to the actual source of 
this loss—“the neighborhoods and communities in which 
gay and lesbian couples live”;50 and such couples should 
work to forge a new community “consensus” there, thus 
“earn[ing] victories through initiatives and legislation and 
the greater acceptance that comes with them.”51 Urging 
that persuading a majority of citizens to “dignify and 
respect the rights of minority groups through 
majoritarian laws” is preferable to doing so “through 
decisions issued by a majority of Supreme Court 
Justices,” the court adds: “Rights need not be 
countermajoritarian to count.”52 Sutton closes his 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 417. 
 49. Id. at 416. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 417. 
 52. Id. at 418.  
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opinion by returning to the themes of tradition and 
change: states—free from judicial intervention—must be 
allowed to decide whether to “expand a definition of 
marriage that until recently was universally followed 
going back to the earliest days of human history”;53 
citizens will be “heroes of their own stories” if they 
resolve this issue outside of the courts.54 
B. JUDGE DAUGHTREY’S DISSENT: DEBUNKING AN “ORIGINAL 
MEANING” APPROACH TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
MARRIAGE 
Judge Sutton’s static conception of marriage 
contrasts strikingly with the picture of marriage 
recounted in Judge Daughtrey’s dissent, which identifies 
the problems with the appeal to “original meaning” as a 
way of resolving the federal constitutional challenge to 
restrictive state marriage laws. As we will see, this 
dissent has echoes in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
in Obergefell. As the passage quoted at the beginning of 
this essay indicates, Daughtrey counters Sutton’s appeal 
to “original meaning” and his argument that “the 
people,” in 1868, did not understand the Fourteenth 
Amendment to “‘require the States to change the 
definition of marriage’” to permit same-sex couples to 
marry with the rejoinder that they also “undoubtedly did 
not understand that it would also require school 
desegregation in 1955 or the end of miscegenation laws 
across the country, beginning in California in 1948 and 
culminating in the Loving decision in 1967.”55 Here 
Daughtrey stresses the challenge of realizing the 
Constitution’s commitments and stresses the role of 
courts in that realization: even after “a civil war, the end 
of slavery, and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in 1868, extensive litigation has been necessary to 
achieve even a modicum of constitutional protection from 
discrimination based on race, and it has occurred 
primarily by judicial decree, not by the democratic 
election process to which the majority suggests we 
 
 53. Id. at 421. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 431 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
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should defer regarding discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.”56 
Daughtrey also challenges Sutton’s picture of a 
universal and—until recently—unchanging definition of 
marriage: “there is not now and never has been a 
universally accepted definition of marriage.”57 For 
starters, “even today, polygynous marriages outnumber 
monogamous ones.”58 Judge Posner makes this point 
emphatically in Baskin v. Bogan, observing that there is 
no acknowledgment of polygyny when the State of 
Wisconsin appeals to “the wonders of tradition” by 
referring to “‘thousands of years of collective 
experience’” as establishing “‘traditional marriage, 
between one man and one woman, as optimal for the 
family, society, and civilization.’”59 Daughtrey further 
observes that, in different historical periods and 
countries, marriage has been “about” many things, 
including religious obligation and political and economic 
arrangements.60 
Historically, marriage was also “about” gender 
inequality, a dimension largely missing from Sutton’s 
account. Daughtrey observes that (as quoted above) 
when Justice Alito noted in Windsor that the opponents 
of DOMA were “implicitly ask[ing] us to endorse [a more 
expansive definition of marriage and] to reject the 
traditional view,” he “may have been unfamiliar with all 
that the ‘traditional view’ entailed, especially for women 
who were subjected to coverture as a result of Anglo-
American common law.”61 Elaborating upon marriage’s 
history as a “profoundly unequal institution, one that 
imposed distinctly different rights and obligations on 
men and women,”62 Daughtrey quotes at length from 
Judge Barbara Berzon’s concurring opinion in Latta v. 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 667 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 60. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 431. 
 61. Id. at 432 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 
(2013) (Alito, J., dissenting)). 
 62. Id. 
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Otter, in which Berzon argued that Idaho and Nevada’s 
“same-sex marriage bans” were unconstitutional 
because “they are classifications on the basis of gender” 
that do not survive intermediate scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause.63 Daughtrey details the magnitude of 
this sex inequality within marriage to make a point about 
constitutional transformation and the limits of an appeal 
to “original meaning”: “Fourteenth Amendment cases 
decided by the Supreme Court in the years since 1971 
that ‘invalidat[ed] various laws and policies that 
categorized by sex have been part of a transformation 
that has altered the very institution at the heart of this 
case, marriage.’”64 The significance of 1971, of course, 
is that Reed v. Reed, decided that year, signaled the 
beginning of the Court’s turning away from what Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg coined the “empty-cupboard 
interpretation of equal protection in relation to sex 
equality claims.”65 The significance of this constitutional 
transformation for purposes of appeals to the “traditional 
definition of marriage” is, as Berzon and Daughtrey 
argue, that marriage as an institution has undergone 
deep transformation. Daughtrey sums up: “The 
majority’s admiration for ‘traditional marriage’ thus 
seems misplaced, if not naive. The legal status has been 
through so many reforms that the marriage of same-sex 
couples constitutes merely the latest wave in a vast sea 
of change.”66 
While Sutton, like Cordy, posits an age-old purpose 
of regulating sex as the reason government got into the 
marriage business, Daughtrey and Berzon appeal to 
historians of the family, such as Nancy Cott, who show 
that the Founders’ political theory viewed marriage as a 
metaphor for consent by the governed (the wife freely 
consented to the husband’s governance of the 
 
 63. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., 
concurring). 
 64. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 432 (quoting Latta, 771 F.3d at 487 (Berzon, 
J., concurring)). 
 65. Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 167. 
 66. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 434. 
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household).67 As these jurists observe, the loss of 
women’s civil capacity and identity was bound up in 
reciprocal, but complementary, gender roles.68 As Cott 
and Linda Kerber elaborate, marriage performed 
important work because, within the family, wives gentled 
men and taught them manners and mothers cultivated 
virtue in their children.69 Moreover, as Hendrik Hartog 
(another historian cited by Daughtrey and Berzon) 
elaborates, “the corollary of wife’s obedience was 
husband’s authority.”70 Further, “[i]mplicit in the idea of 
coverture was [an] image . . . of a wife as the possession 
of her husband, as [a] husband’s property.”71 All of this 
gender work going on within the marital household is 
distinct from the “responsible procreation” argument 
that Sutton and others insist has always been the reason 
to regulate marriage. Certainly, the combination of 
criminal and marital law drew a sharp line between licit 
and illicit sex and between marital and nonmarital 
children. However, as Daughtrey points out, “although 
sex was strongly presumed to be an essential part of 
marriage, the ability to procreate was not.”72 
Daughtrey observes that Cott, an expert witness who 
testified on behalf of the plaintiffs in the trial in DeBoer 
concerning whether there were rational bases for 
Michigan’s restrictive marriage laws, “explained how the 
concept of marriage and the roles of marriage partners 
have changed over time.”73 One example was the erosion 
of coverture and of “traditional gender-assigned roles”; 
another was that “interracial marriages are legal now that 
 
 67. NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 9-
16 (1999). 
 68. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 432-33 (quoting Latta, 771 F.3d at 487 
(Berzon, J., concurring); COTT, supra note 67; and other sources). 
 69. COTT, supra note 67, at 19–21; see also LINDA KERBER, WOMEN OF THE 
REPUBLIC 199-200 (1980). For further discussion of the family as a seedbed 
of civic virtue (despite sex inequality), see LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF 
FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 56-64 (2006).  
 70. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 149-50 (2000). 
 71. Id. at 137. Daughtrey reproduces a passage from Judge Berzon’s 
concurrence that cites Hartog on a husband’s possessory interest in his wife. 
DeBoer, 773 F.3d at 432–33 (quoting HARTOG, supra note 70, at 137). 
 72. DeBoer, 773 F.3d at 433. 
 73. Id. at 425. 
MCCLAIN READING DEBOER CONST COMM_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/1/2017  2:33 PM 
2016] ON EVOLVING UNDERSTANDINGS 459 
 
the antiquated, racist concept of preserving the purity of 
the white race has fallen into its rightful place of 
dishonor.”74 
Daughtrey also summarizes the holdings and 
reasoning of the four circuit courts that had (by then) 
struck down state marriage laws to show, in effect, the 
importance of a moral reading. In other words, over time, 
the Nation better realizes the Constitution’s abstract 
commitments to liberty and equality and the aspirational 
principles entailed in those provisions. In Bostic v. 
Schaefer, for example, the Fourth Circuit read Loving to 
illustrate that “‘the right to marry is an expansive liberty 
interest that may stretch to accommodate changing 
societal norms.’”75 The Fourth Circuit, Judge Daughtrey 
observes, pointed to the “principle” articulated by 
Justice Kennedy in United States v. Windsor—invoking 
Loving in support—that “‘[s]tate laws defining and 
regulating marriage, of course, must respect the 
constitutional rights of persons.’”76 Loving has been 
enormously significant in this post-Windsor 
jurisprudence as a vital precedent for the fundamental 
right to marry and for the argument that such a right 
must not be read narrowly, but broadly to include the 
freedom to marry the person of one’s choice (regardless 
of race or gender).77 
To connect this to the sex discrimination argument 
for a constitutional challenge to the one man-one woman 
marriage definition, the entire edifice of domestic 
relations law rested on gender hierarchy, (subsequently) 
separate spheres ideology, and premises of gender 
ordering. A combination of state law reform and 
 
 74. Id.  
 75. 760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 76. DeBoer, 773 F.3d at 429 (citing Bostic, 760 F. 3d at 379 (quoting 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691)). 
 77. See, e.g., Bostic, 760 F.3d at 384 (concluding that excluding same-
sex couples from marriage excludes them “from participating fully in our 
society, which is precisely the type of segregation that the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot countenance”); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 477–78 
(9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citing Loving in rejecting a narrow 
definition of the right to marry that would confine it to those historically 
allowed to exercise it and embracing evolving interpretation of “liberty”). 
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constitutional litigation (including the shift away from the 
“empty-cupboard” interpretation of the Equal Protection 
clause) has dismantled nearly all of that edifice. The one 
man-one woman definition, one may plausibly argue, is a 
vestige of coverture and the “sex-based legal rules once 
imbedded in the institution” and also reflects gender 
stereotyping because it related to the different, 
complementary roles or offices that husbands and wives 
were to perform as head of the household and obedient 
and dependent feme covert.78 
C. GOODRIDGE AS A TEMPLATE FOR DUAL EVOLUTION AND A 
MORAL READING 
Family law scholars and historians of marriage will 
find the conception of marriage as an evolving institution 
set out in Judge Daughtrey’s dissent, in Judge Berzon’s 
concurrence, and in other judicial opinions far more 
persuasive as a matter of history than Judge Sutton’s 
(and, subsequently, than the opinions of the dissenting 
justices in Obergefell),79 just as moral readers will find 
it a better account of realization of aspirational principles 
and generational moral progress. If Justice Cordy’s 
dissent in Goodridge provides an early template for a 
universally understood, not fundamentally changing 
conception of marriage (originating in channelling 
responsible procreation), then a template for the 
conception of marriage as an evolving institution, shaped 
by remedying injustices within it, features in Chief 
Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Goodridge. This 
 
 78. See Latta, 771 F.3d at 490 (Berzon, B., J. concurring) (citing Baker 
v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). It is beyond the scope of this Essay to discuss the many 
scholarly sources advancing this argument. 
 79. Such scholars have also contributed amicus briefs elaborating that 
evolution. See Cott, supra note 7 (discussing role of such briefs in Obergefell); 
Amici Curiae Brief of the Professors of the History of Marriage, Families, and 
the Law at 2, Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.32d 941 (Mass. 
2003) (No. SCJ-08860), (arguing that: “allowing same-sex couples to 
participate as full citizens in the institution of marriage is not a radical 
change,” but “the logical next step in this Court’s long tradition of reforming 
marriage to fit the evolving nature of committed intimate relationships and the 
rights of the individuals in those relationships”). The author of this essay was 
a signatory to this brief filed in Goodridge. 
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pathbreaking opinion also warrants mention for paving 
the way for Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion, 
particularly in the way it uses history. Evolution away 
from race and sex discrimination in the law of marriage 
is part of this conception. Marshall looks to the “long 
history” in many states, including Massachusetts, during 
which “no lawful marriage was possible between black 
and white Americans,” but observes that “long history” 
did not prevent, first, the California Supreme Court, and, 
subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court to rule that such 
laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment.80 So, too, in 
the case of the bar on same-sex marriage, Marshall 
argues, “history must yield to a more fully developed 
understanding of the invidious quality of the 
discrimination.”81 
Marshall offers a moral reading, quoting the very 
passage from VMI that Sutton invokes, to different 
effect: “The history of constitutional law ‘is the story of 
the extension of constitutional rights and protections to 
people once ignored or excluded,’” evident in Supreme 
Court precedents striking down sex and race 
discrimination as contrary to Equal Protection.82 
Marshall finds that this is as true for “civil marriage” as 
for other areas of “civil rights,” offering the demise of 
both antimiscegenation law and coverture as examples: 
As a public institution and a right of fundamental 
importance, civil marriage is an evolving paradigm. 
The common law was exceptionally harsh toward 
women who became wives: a woman’s legal identity all 
but evaporated into that of her husband. . . . But since 
at least the middle of the Nineteenth Century, both the 
courts and the legislature have acted to ameliorate the 
harshness of the common law regime. . . . Alarms over 
the imminent erosion of the “natural” order of 
marriage were sounded over the demise of 
antimiscegenation laws, the expansion of the rights of 
married women, and the introduction of “no fault” 
divorce. Marriage has survived all of these 
 
 80. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 966. 
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transformations, and we have no doubt that marriage 
will continue to be a vibrant and revered institution.83 
In this passage, Marshall not only analogizes to prior 
forms of discriminatory marriage laws to situate the 
present challenge by same-sex couples, but also 
concludes that marriage as an institution has survived 
seeming challenges to the “natural” order of things and 
predicts that it will continue to do so.84 
Finally, Marshall adopts a moral reading in declaring 
that the Court has authority to provide a remedy by 
“constru[ing] civil marriage to mean the voluntary union 
of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all 
others.”85 She explains that such a remedy is “entirely 
consonant with established principles of jurisprudence 
empowering a court to refine a common-law principle in 
light of evolving constitutional standards.”86 Concurring 
Justice Greaney expressly rejects an “original intent” 
approach to constitutional interpretation, indicating that 
“the provisions of our Constitution are, and must be, 
adaptable to changing circumstances and new social 
phenomena.”87 
III. “MORAL READINGS VERSUS ORIGINALISMS” IN 
OBERGEFELL 
In the wake of the circuit split created by DeBoer, 
and the Supreme Court granting certiorari, amici filed a 
record number of amicus curiae briefs.88 These set forth 
many constitutional pathways for reversing or affirming 
the Sixth Circuit. Most pertinent for this essay are (1) 
those briefs filed by legal scholars enlisting originalism 
 
 83. Id. at 966–67. 
 84. Id. at 967. Concurring Justice Greaney invoked these changes in 
marriage law in making a sex discrimination argument against the one man-
one woman definition. Id. at 970-74 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 969. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 974 n.6 (Greaney, J., concurring) (disagreeing with dissenting 
Justice Cordy’s argument that because “the people,” when they revised the 
Massachusetts Constitution in 1976, did not intend it to be “relied upon to 
approve same-sex marriage,” it cannot now be used to reach that result). 
 88. See Liptak, supra note 5 (147 briefs). 
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either to strike down or uphold the restrictive state 
marriage laws and (2) those filed by historians to 
delineate the history of marriage and of the treatment of 
LGBT persons in the United States. 
In this Part, I first discuss various new originalist 
arguments made in Obergefell and challenged by other 
originalist scholars. I point out that the Obergefell 
dissenters hued closer to what Fleming would call 
conventional forms of originalism than the new 
originalism, similar to that of Judge Sutton in DeBoer. I 
then argue that Justice Kennedy’s majority in Obergefell 
is more compatible with a moral reading than with an 
originalist one in its focus on the dual evolution of 
understanding constitutional principles and of the 
institution of marriage. Notably, while Kennedy did not 
enlist the new originalist briefs or arguments, he did 
draw upon the briefs filed by historians and historians of 
marriage in his discussion of the relevance of history. 
A. COMPETING VISIONS OF ORIGINALISM 
The Cato Institute, along with William Eskridge Jr., 
Steven Calabresi, and several other legal scholars, filed 
an amicus brief arguing that the DeBoer majority opinion 
“erred by focusing on a certain kind of original 
understanding” of the Equal Protection Clause—“the 
immediate effect supporters ‘understood’ the Fourteenth 
Amendment to have”—rather than on “original 
meaning.”89 Amici contended that the latter approach is 
that taken by the Supreme Court, under which it “has 
asked how the well-established meaning of terminology 
added to the Constitution in 1868 applies to modern 
 
 89. Cato Institute Brief, supra note 15, at 3. One signatory to the brief, 
William Eskridge, is a pioneer in the field of sexual orientation and the law and 
an advocate of dynamic statutory interpretation, perhaps making his turn to 
originalism surprising. Ilya Somin, a signatory on a different amicus brief 
enlisting originalism (The Legal Scholars Brief, supra note 15, discussed 
infra), observes that while “Eskridge himself is not an originalist—at least not 
in the sense of believing that originalism generally trumps other modes of 
constitutional interpretation, . . . as Michael Ramsey notes, ‘[i]t says 
something about originalism’s new place that the most prominent academic 
defender of same sex marriage makes the text’s original meaning the 
centerpiece of his argument.’” Somin, supra note 28, at 1-2.  
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exclusion of new as well as established social groups.”90 
On this approach, it would not be controlling that “there 
is no evidence that ‘the people who adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment understood it to require the 
States to change the definition of marriage.’”91 The Cato 
Institute Brief argues that the “original meaning” of the 
Equal Protection Clause is “the protection of equal 
laws,” and that it “prohibits caste legislation that 
discriminates against a social class, ‘not to further a 
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to 
everyone else.’”92 While “original understanding” will not 
suffice to justify certain Equal Protection precedents, 
this original meaning approach can do so. 
The Cato Institute Brief articulates one form of what 
Fleming would call “new originalism”: it contends that 
“original-meaning originalism ‘is entirely consistent with 
updating the application of its fixed principles in light of 
new factual information. Indeed, such updating is often 
not only permitted, but actually required by the 
theory.’”93 On this approach, while there was “no class 
of ‘gay people’ who could be targets of a caste regime” 
in 1868, a legal regime subsequently developed that 
“defined ‘homosexuals’ as a pariah class outside the 
general benefits and protections of the laws”;94 recently 
enacted state defense of marriage statutes and 
constitutional amendments “expanded” this caste 
regime.95 Seen in this light, then, “updating” involves 
recognizing that “distinctions between opposite-sex and 
same-sex couples do not serve any legitimate interest 
and are instead founded on the core stereotypes that 
have underwritten the past century’s anti-gay 
legislation.”96 
 
 90. Cato Institute Brief, supra note 15, at 3 (citing VMI; Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
 91. Id. at 2–3 (quoting DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 403 (6th Cir. 
2014)). 
 92. Id. at 3 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635). 
 93. Id. at 4 (citing Somin, supra note 28). 
 94. Id. at 18. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 24–25. 
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The second brief that enlisted a form of new 
originalism to challenge restrictive state marriage laws 
was filed by Andrew Koppelman and several other legal 
scholars. It makes a sex discrimination argument: laws 
forbidding same-sex couples to marry classify on the 
basis of sex and often rest on impermissible gender 
stereotypes and, thus, require intermediate scrutiny.97 
As discussed in Part II, Judge Berzon’s Latta 
concurrence and some other judicial opinions make this 
argument. What this brief adds is the contention that 
“laws restricting the right to marry on the basis of 
gender go against . . . the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”98 As does the Cato Institute, 
this second brief criticizes Judge Sutton’s claim that 
those laws “are consistent with the original meaning, 
because few if any observers in 1868 would have 
thought otherwise.”99 They counter that “as most 
originalists recognize today, the original expected 
applications of the framers are distinct from the original 
understanding of the meaning of the text. Only the latter 
is controlling law.”100 This form of originalism, to use 
Fleming’s framework, seems to be “abstract originalism” 
in that it recognizes that “[m]any important provisions of 
the Constitution establish broad, general principles that 
must be applied to factual conditions that can change 
over time.”101 However, it is not the principles that seem 
to evolve, but “our understanding of the relevant facts 
. . . as new evidence accumulates.”102 It is “changes in 
factual understanding” from 1868 to the present that 
support an argument, today, that restrictive marriage 
laws are a prohibited form of sex discrimination; for in 
1868, “the drafters and ratifiers of the [14th] 
 
 97. Legal Scholars Brief, supra note 15. Koppelman, one author on the 
brief, is known for advancing the argument that discrimination against gay men 
and lesbians (including restrictions on the right to marry) is sex discrimination; 
like Eskridge, he is not generally viewed as an originalist. See Andrew 
Koppleman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).  
 98. Legal Scholars Brief, supra note 15, at 23-24. 
 99. Id. at 24.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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amendment believed that many forms of sex 
discrimination were compatible with the Amendment’s 
general ban on ‘class’ and ‘caste’ discrimination.”103 
Indeed, the Legal Scholars Brief chronicles the long 
history of appeals to “natural” differences between men 
and women to justify laws that discriminated on the basis 
of gender, including laws about gender roles within 
marriage.104 Such would be the assumptions of “most 
Americans in 1868.”105 The authors draw parallels 
between present-day recognition of the unsoundness of 
nineteenth century assumptions about gender roles 
within marriage and “overwhelming evidence” today 
indicating that “same-sex marriages are capable of 
carrying out the major social purposes of opposite-sex 
marriage, including raising children and strengthening 
social ties.”106 
Obliquely addressing a question posed two years 
earlier by Justice Scalia in the oral argument over the 
constitutional challenge to Proposition 8—about the date 
on which laws banning same-sex marriage became 
unconstitutional—the brief contends: “In order to justify 
striking down laws banning same-sex marriage, we need 
not identify exactly when the accumulation of evidence 
became great enough to be decisive, only that it reached 
that point at some time before the present case came 
before the court.”107 
Both of these briefs reject the narrow “original 
meaning” approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit in favor 
 
 103. Id. at 25. The authors give the example of Robert Bork’s account of 
why the Court in Brown v. Board of Education was justified because “[b]y 
1954 . . . it had been apparent for some time that segregation rarely if ever 
produced equality.” Id. (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 82 
(1990)). 
 104. Id. at 26–27. 
 105. Id. at 27. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 27–28 (citing Ilya Somin, How to Figure Out When Laws Banning 
Same-Sex Marriage Became Unconstitutional, and Why the Precise Date May 
Not Matter, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 26, 2013, 11:44 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2-13/03/26/how-to-figure-out-when-laws-banning-same-
sex-marriage-became-unconstitutional-and-why-the-precise-date-may-not-
matter/). 
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of what Fleming might call “abstract originalism,” which 
is more like a moral reading than conventional 
originalism. These brief authors might resist his 
argument that they are engaging in a moral reading 
because they insist that the moving parts are not 
evolution in understanding of principles of equality or 
liberty, but evolution in understanding of facts and the 
application of those principles to facts. Is this a 
distinction with a difference? Certainly, evaluating those 
facts requires some exercise of moral and political 
judgment. On this question of the boundaries of 
originalism, two observations based on the Obergefell 
record may be helpful. First, it is telling that some 
originalist legal scholars (including Lawrence Alexander 
and Steven D. Smith), along with the Marriage Law 
Foundation, filed an amicus brief specifically challenging 
the Cato Institute’s account of “original meaning” and 
contending that the Cato Institute Brief’s approach was 
more akin to that of Ronald Dworkin, a “sophisticated 
critic of originalist constitutionalism.”108 Indeed, 
Fleming views Dworkin as a leading exemplar of a moral 
reading approach (pp. 11, 73-74); the Scholars of 
Originalism Brief characterizes Dworkin’s approach as 
one where “judges should enforce the general ‘concepts’ 
reflected in the Constitution, not the specific 
‘conceptions’ contemplated by the enactors.”109 While 
Dworkin and similar critics of originalism specifically 
acknowledged that “they were opposing historical 
meaning as an authoritative criterion,” the Cato Brief 
exemplifies a tack of making “prodigious use of the 
‘abstraction’ strategy, while continuing to claim the label 
of ‘originalism.’”110 Indeed, the Scholars of Originalism 
Brief asserts that while there may be “definite 
advantages, at least within the academy, in turning 
‘originalism’ into a big tent that can include almost 
anyone,” such as “dispel[ling] some of the hostility that 
originalism has sometimes provoked,” “if ‘original 
meaning’ is defined so loosely that virtually everyone and 
 
 108. Scholars of Originalism Brief, supra note 16, at 15.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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every decision can be classed as ‘originalist,’ the term 
ceases to have any real meaning at all.”111 (These 
criticisms echo those Fleming makes of Baude’s 
“inclusive originalism.” (pp. 15-19)) Finally, the authors 
proffer their most serious objection to this “theoretical 
conception of ‘original meaning’ that is highly abstract 
and separated from the ‘understanding’ of constitutional 
enactors and ratifiers”: 
[it] defeats the goal of permitting “We the People,” 
acting through our elected representatives in 
Congress and the state legislatures, to deliberate 
intelligently and understandingly about proposed 
constitutional measures, and then to decide whether 
or not to entrench those measures in our 
constitutional law.112 
Second, none of the conservative members of the 
Court—all of whom dissented in Obergefell—accepted 
these newer approaches to original meaning. Instead, 
they hued closer to the approach taken by Judge Sutton. 
Justice Scalia insisted that “the People’s 
understanding”—“when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified in 1868”—that states did and could 
(constitutionally) limit marriage to one man and one 
woman “resolves these cases.”113 As Cott observes, 
“more than one version of the history of marriage [was] 
operating” in Obergefell.114 Chief Justice Roberts viewed 
marriage as an “unvarying social institution.” He 
asserted that the “singular understanding of marriage”—
as the union of one man and one woman—“has prevailed 
in the United States throughout our history,” so that “to 
those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, this 
conception of marriage and family ‘was a given. . . .’”115 
Further, because “the Constitution itself says nothing 
about marriage . . . the Framers . . . entrusted” the 
subject of domestic relations—including the definition of 
 
 111. Id. at 15–16. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 114. Cott, supra note 7, at 1. 
 115. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
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marriage—to the states.116 Affirmatively citing DeBoer, 
Roberts observes that, before and after statehood, the 
four states whose laws are under challenge “defined 
marriage in the traditional, biologically rooted way.”117 
Like Sutton, Roberts endorses the responsible 
procreation rationale for this definition of marriage.118 
Roberts concurs with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that, 
rather than “‘constitutionalizing the definition of 
marriage,’” it should be left in “the place it has been 
since the founding: in the hands of state voters.”119 
Justice Alito argues similarly, charging the majority with 
giving a “distinctively postmodern meaning” to Due 
Process “liberty.”120 Finally, Justice Thomas appeals to 
how “the Framers” understood “liberty” to argue that 
the Court is “deviating from the original meaning” of the 
Due Process Clauses.121 
It is clear, thus, that none of the conservative 
justices found the new originalism persuasive. What 
about Justice Kennedy, who everyone assumed would be 
the decisive vote one way or the other? To the extent 
that amici pitched their new originalist arguments to “an 
audience of one,”122 it is telling that while Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion repeatedly referred to the “meaning” 
of marriage as well as of liberty and equality, he 
emphasized evolving meaning, not “original meaning.” 
Further, he did not follow the route of deploying “original 
meaning” to hold the state laws unconstitutional as sex 
discrimination or (explicitly) as impermissible class 
discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2614. 
 118. Id.; see supra Part II.A for discussion of this argument.  
 119. Id. at 2615. 
 120. Id. at 2640; see also id. at 2642 (because “the Constitution simply 
does not speak to the issue of same-sex marriage” by including a “right to 
marry a person of the same sex,” it falls to “the people,” not the Court, to 
“control their destiny” and decide on whether to fundamentally change the 
definition of marriage). 
 121. Id. at 2632–34 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 122. Cf. Susan R. Estrich and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: 
Writing for an Audience of One 138 U. PENN. L. REV. 119 (1989) (making 
argument for women’s reproductive rights aimed at Justice O’Connor). 
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Amendment.123 More obviously influential on Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion than the new originalist briefs 
discussed above were briefs filed by historians that 
informed his account of these forms of evolution. As 
Nancy Cott (coauthor of an influential amicus brief and a 
frequent expert in marriage litigation) observed, “history 
really matter[ed]” in Justice Kennedy’s landmark 
majority opinion, specifically, the history of the 
institution of marriage and how it has “changed over time 
to admit new understandings of liberty and equality” as 
well as “the history of condemnation and criminalization 
of same-sex intimacy until recent decades.”124 Kennedy 
enlisted this history, I will argue, in service of a moral 
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B. THE OBERGEFELL MAJORITY OPINION: DUAL FORMS OF 
EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING 
Justice Kennedy’s landmark majority opinion in 
Obergefell crucially deployed two forms of evolving 
understanding—of constitutional guarantees of equality 
and the “promise of liberty” as well as of the institution 
of marriage. Those two forms of evolution worked 
together in his opinion to reject a static notion either of 
the fundamental right to marry or of marriage itself. They 
both undergird the holding that same-sex couples may 
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states. 
They reflect a moral reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
With respect to the evolving understanding of the 
Constitution’s “promise” of liberty, Kennedy opens the 
Obergefell opinion with the declaration that: “The 
Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a 
liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow 
persons within a lawful realm, to define and express their 
identity.”125 This language closely parallels the opening 
 
 123. Notably, an author on the Cato Institute Brief acknowledges that 
Justice Kennedy did not adopt various originalist arguments. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The Marriage Equaltiy Cases and Constitutional Theory, 2015 
CATO. SUP. CT. REV. 111. 
 124. Cott, supra note 7.  
 125. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
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passage of Lawrence v. Texas: “[l]iberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, 
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”126 
Similarly, the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey declared: “It is a promise of the Constitution that 
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government 
may not enter.”127 
“Insight,” or evolving understanding, plays a critical 
role in Lawrence, for example, about fulfilling “the 
promise of liberty.” Lawrence ends with the often-quoted 
passage that the ratifiers of the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not “presume” 
to have the “insight” to map specifically all the 
components of liberty, but instead “knew times can blind 
us to certain truths and later generations can see that 
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve 
only to oppress.”128 Because of this temporal dimension 
to understanding constitutional principles, Kennedy 
adds: “As the Constitution endures, persons in every 
generation can invoke its principles in their own search 
for greater freedom.”129 The joint opinion in Casey made 
a similar statement about the Constitution as “a covenant 
running from the first generation of Americans to us and 
then to future generations” and that “[e]ach generation 
must learn anew that the Constitution’s written terms 
embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more 
ages than one.”130 In Fidelity to Our Imperfect 
Constitution, Fleming points to both of these opinions—
and these passages—as exemplifying a moral reading 
(pp. 58, 191). 
Obergefell builds on this idea by observing that: 
“[t]he nature of injustice is that we may not see it in our 
own times.”131 Thus, as “new insight” reveals “discord” 
between the Constitution’s “central protections” and “a 
received legal stricture,” claims of liberty “must be 
 
 126. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 127. 505 U.S. 833, 844, 847 (1992). 
 128. 539 U.S. at 578–79. 
 129. Id. at 579. 
 130. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901. 
 131. 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
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addressed.”132 New insights about constitutional 
guarantees intersect with new insights about marriage as 
new generations help to reveal that what once seemed 
“natural and just”—defining marriage only as the union 
of one man and one woman—now is an injustice that is 
“inconsisten[t] with the central meaning of the 
fundamental right to marry.”133 This view of marriage 
stands in sharp contrast with that offered in the several 
dissents, which argue for the unchanging, universal 
definition and purpose of marriage. In Windsor, just two 
years earlier, Justice Kennedy observed that New York’s 
citizens and elected representatives, in enacting a law 
allowing same-sex couples to marry, acted to “correct” 
what they now perceived “to be an injustice that they had 
not earlier known or understood.”134 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion closely resembles the 
opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, in 
which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
stated that marriage is an “evolving paradigm”—rather 
than static.135 Moreover, Kennedy, like the Goodridge 
court, goes further in contending that “new insights” 
have spurred “deep transformations” that have 
“strengthened, not weakened, the institution of 
marriage.”136 In canvassing these transformations, 
Kennedy cites to the amicus brief filed by the Historians 
of Marriage and the American Historical Association,137 
which challenged the Sixth Circuit’s argument that 
correcting any injustices in that law should be left to the 
democratic process as community mores evolve. That 
brief contends that: “[J]udicial review has often led to the 
recognition that traditional or discriminatory views of 
marriage (and marriage-related laws) must give way in 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2602. 
 134. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
 135. 798 N.E.2d 941, 966–67 (Mass. 2003). 
 136. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595–96. 
 137. Brief of Historians of Marriage and the American Historical 
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, -562, -571, and -574) [hereinafter 
Marriage Historians Brief]. 
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the face of evolving understandings of race and gender 
embodied in constitutional guarantees under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”138 
Countering the Sixth Circuit’s assertion of a universal 
definition of marriage and marriage’s origin in 
channelling procreation, the Marriage Historians Brief 
chronicles the “multiple” political, social, economic, 
legal, and personal purposes served by marriage as a 
civil institution “[o]ver this Nation’s history” since the 
founding.139 The brief also charts the evolution of the 
laws governing marriage as the Nation has recognized 
the injustice of restricting some citizens from exercising 
the right to marry.140 While Judge Sutton rooted 
marriage’s origin in laws of nature, the Marriage 
Historians Brief points out how opponents of the demise 
of coverture attacked its dismantling as “blasphemous 
and unnatural,” contrary to Divine will;141 opponents of 
the striking down of antimiscegenation laws later warned 
that “permitting cross-racial couples to marry would 
fatally degrade the institution of marriage,” on the 
premise that “marriages across the color line were 
against nature, and against the Divine plan (as some 
opponents argue today against same-sex marriage).”142 
While the dissents emphasize the determinative role 
of history and tradition, Kennedy takes a more critical 
approach to history. While conceding that the historical 
understanding of marriage was a union between one man 
and one woman, he rejects the respondent states’ 
argument that history is not only “the beginning of these 
cases,” but also “should be the end as well.”143 Instead, 
he observes: “The history of marriage is one of both 
continuity and change.”144 
In explaining how new insights about the injustice 
within basic institutions such as marriage are gained, 
 
 138. Id. at 22. 
 139. Id. at 6–7.  
 140. Id. at 6. 
 141. Id. at 18. 
 142. Id. at 21. 
 143. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595. 
 144. Id. 
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Kennedy again sounds the theme of generational moral 
progress: “changed understandings of marriage are 
characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of 
freedom become apparent to new generations.”145 
Further, social movements seeking change play a role, 
since these new understandings often become apparent 
“through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and 
then are considered in the political sphere and the 
judicial process.”146 Kennedy’s view of the relationship 
between democracy and constitutionalism differs notably 
from Judge Sutton’s and from the Obergefell dissents. 
What new insights about marriage inform the 
majority’s holding that same-sex couples may exercise 
the fundamental right to marry? One source of insight is 
the substantial body of case law growing out of 
challenges by same-sex couples to state marriage laws 
and to the federal DOMA, beginning back in the 1990s 
in Hawaii and proliferating post-Windsor. Kennedy says 
that case law has helped to “explain and formulate the 
underlying principles” about the right to marry that the 
Court concludes apply equally to same-sex and opposite-
sex couples.147 
Another significant “new insight” involving “changing 
understandings” arising out of social movements and 
“pleas and protests” is not about marriage as such, but 
about the capacity of gay men and lesbians to enter into 
it. To chronicle this “dynamic,” Kennedy draws on 
another historical brief, filed by the Organization of 
American Historians.148 That history includes long moral 
condemnation of “same-sex intimacy,” a condemnation 
expressed in the criminal law (upheld in Bowers v. 
Hardwick but eventually struck down in Lawrence).149 
Kennedy observes that the Supreme Court, “like many 
 
 145. Id. at 2596. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 2597. 
 148. Brief of the Organization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 
14-556, -562, -571, -574). 
 149. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (citing Organization of American 
Historians Brief, supra note 136, 5-28). 
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institutions,” made “assumptions defined by the world 
and time of which it is a part,” thus issuing a one 
sentence summary affirmance (in 1972) in one of the 
earliest challenges by a same-sex couple to state 
marriage laws, Baker v. Nelson, which Obergefell 
overrules.150 That history also includes a failure to 
appreciate the dignitary claims of gays and lesbians and, 
prior to 1973, a labeling of their sexual orientation as a 
mental disorder rather than as a “normal expression of 
human sexuality and immutable.”151 
Three prior Kennedy opinions—Romer, Lawrence, 
and Windsor—all were turning points in marking this new 
insight; those opinions have characteristic vocabulary of 
concern for dignity and respect and not demeaning the 
existence of gay men and lesbians. Windsor shifts the 
focus to the dignity and respect conferred by the bond 
of marriage itself upon same-sex couples and the 
message of inequality sent by DOMA when it fails to 
recognize their marriages. Windsor involved a two-step 
process: (1) Lawrence declaring that the intimate lives 
of same-sex couples were worthy of dignity and respect; 
and (2) the state of New York conferring dignity and 
respect and community stature through allowing such 
couples to marry.152 By contrast, Obergefell holds that 
those couples may exercise that right pursuant to the 
Federal Constitution itself, in light of evolving 
understandings both of constitutional freedom and of 
marriage. 
Two other new insights about marriage warrant 
mention because they contribute to the majority’s 
conclusion that deep transformations in marriage 
actually strengthen the institution: the demise of laws 
barring interracial marriage and the repudiation of 
gender hierarchy in marriage. As discussed in Part II, 
these two transformations feature prominently in prior 
marriage equality jurisprudence, as evidenced in the 
DeBoer dissent and the Goodridge majority. Kennedy 
relates these insights to the intertwining of Due Process 
 
 150. Id. at 2598. 
 151. Id. at 2596. 
 152. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2677, 2694 (2013). 
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and Equal Protection in understanding the scope of the 
right to marry. The intertwining or “synergy” between 
these two clauses is another characteristic theme in 
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence.153 He invokes Loving v. 
Virginia to illustrate the “interrelation” of the 
independent principles of each Clause. The Court’s 
invalidation of racial restrictions on who may marry drew 
on both Equal Protection and Due Process. While 
conventional understandings of Loving have emphasized 
its equal protection holding, Justice Kennedy argues that 
looking at liberty and equality together helped to make 
“the reasons why marriage is a fundamental right 
bec[o]me more clear and compelling.”154 Notably, 
Kennedy refers to this understanding as coming from a 
“full awareness and understanding of the hurt that 
resulted” from such laws.155 Hurt and humiliation, of 
course, was a large theme in Windsor and in numerous 
post-Windsor federal opinions; it is not a prominent 
theme in the economically written Loving opinion 
itself.156 
In a passage that may reflect the influence of Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy offers his second 
example of how interpreting the Equal Protection Clause 
can lead the Court to recognize “that new insights and 
societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality 
within our most fundamental institutions that once 
passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”157 That example is 
that, even in the 1970s and 1980s, “invidious sex-based 
classifications in marriage remained common”; such 
 
 153. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. Similarly, in Goodridge, Chief Justice 
Marshall—citing Perez and Lawrence—observed that, “in matters implicating 
marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children, the two constitutional 
concepts [of liberty and equality] frequently overlap as they do here.” 798 
N.E.2d at 953. 
 154. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.  
 155. Id.  
 156. In her dissent in DeBoer, Judge Daughtrey led with the majority’s 
disturbing lack of attention to the “actual plaintiffs as persons, suffering actual 
harm,” as well as the impact of the restrictive laws upon their children, 
drawing on the extensive trial record about the capacity of gay and lesbian 
parents to rear children. 772 F.3d at 421–28.  
 157. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
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laws “denied the equal dignity of men and women.” The 
Court, “responding to a new awareness,” used equal 
protection principles “to invalidate laws imposing sex-
based inequality on marriage.”158 
Kennedy, thus, observes that the Court has 
“correct[ed] inequalities” based on race and sex within 
the institution of marriage, thus vindicating “precepts of 
liberty and equality.”159 His opinion also notes the 
intertwining of liberty and equality in Lawrence and then 
asserts that the same dynamic applies to same-sex 
marriage. The significance of evolving understanding is 
evident when the Court states: “It is now clear that the 
challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples 
. . . and . . . abridge central precepts of equality.”160 
Significant themes about denial of liberty and equality 
join together here: against a “long history of disapproval 
of their relationships”—recall the constitutional limits in 
liberty and equality cases on singling out a group based 
on moral disapproval—this denial of the right to marry 
“works a grave and continuing harm.”161 The denial 
imposes a “disability” on them that “serves to disrespect 
and subordinate them.”162 Although Romer is not cited 
here, that opinion noted the disability imposed by 
Amendment 2 forbidding protection against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or 
conduct.163 To be sure, new originalists might well argue 
that the majority’s use of the language of imposing a 
“disability” upon a class that is singled out is consistent 
with the “original meaning” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as anti-class legislation.164 I believe, 
though, that the role of evolving understanding of the 
meaning of constitutional guarantees, so prevalent in 
Kennedy’s opinion, signals a moral reading. For instance, 
Kennedy states: 
 
 158. Id. at 2604. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 164. See Cato Institute Brief, supra note 15, at 17–24 (arguing that 
restrictive state marriage laws expand an “anti-gay caste regime”). 
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The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may 
long have seemed natural and just, but its 
inconsistency with the central meaning of the 
fundamental right to marry is now manifest. With that 
knowledge must come the recognition that laws 
excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right 
impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our 
basic charter.165 
While new factual understandings play a role, normative 
judgments about justice and about rights also evolve. 
By contrast to Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the 
evolution of the institution of marriage to correct 
injustices within it, Chief Justice Roberts rejects the idea 
that these were “fundamental” transformations. On his 
view, the fundamental (essential) character of marriage 
through all these changes was as a one man-one woman 
institution. This minimizing strategy is unpersuasive. 
Defenders of bans on interracial marriage stressed 
marriage’s link to procreation; preventing mixed-race 
offspring was a central rationale offered for those 
laws.166 Further, the Marriage Historians Brief and other 
briefs emphasized some of the similarity in arguments 
made in defense of these laws and of bans on same-sex 
marriage.167 
Roberts is also unpersuasive when he asserts that if 
you asked a person on the street, while state marriage 
law embraced the common law’s model of gender 
hierarchy, they would never had defined marriage as “the 
union of a man and a woman, where the woman is subject 
to coverture.”168 They may well not have used the term 
“coverture,” but many likely would have had an everyday 
understanding of marriage as a domestic relation in 
which husband and wife occupied distinct, and 
 
 165. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (emphasis added).  
 166. See generally PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY (2009). 
 167. Marriage Historians Brief, supra note 137, at 22–23. See Brief 
Amicus Curiae of Carlos A. Ball et al. in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, -562, -571, -574) (drawing 
parallels between “pseudoscientific” and “pseudoempirical” justifications 
offered for antimiscegenation laws and opposition to same-sex marriage).  
 168. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614. 
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complementary gender roles, with the husband as the 
head of the household and representative of the family 
in public life, and the wife as subject to and properly 
dependent upon her husband. Civil marriage, as the 
Marriage Historians Brief explains, developed in Western 
political culture as closely related to governance, in 
particular, with male heads of households as “delegates” 
for those within the household.169 
C. A ROAD NOT TAKEN: SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Kennedy declined to make a full-blown sex 
discrimination argument for striking down state marriage 
laws limiting marriage to one man and one woman, 
although such an argument was among those advanced 
by the petitioners and a number of amici. If Justice 
Ginsburg had written a concurring opinion that (similar 
to Judge Berzon) elaborated that sex discrimination 
rationale, the Court’s new Equal Protection 
jurisprudence and corresponding changes in family law 
would likely have been central components. While, as 
noted above, the Legal Scholars Brief offered this 
argument as consistent with “original meaning” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, I would argue that any such 
Ginsburg opinion would likely have evidence of a moral 
reading. Fleming argues, for example, that Ginsburg, like 
Justice Brennan, is a moral reader who believes that “the 
point of adopting and amending the Constitution is not to 
embody longstanding historical practices but to 
transform them in pursuit of our constitutional 
aspirations to normative principles like liberty equality 
and liberty” (p. 44). Ginsburg long ago called for “boldly 
dynamic interpretation,” rather than an “original 
understanding” approach to change the long history of 
“empty-cupboard” jurisprudence with respect to sex 
equality.170 Ginsburg, like Justice O’Connor before her, 
has given her share of speeches pointing out some of 
the “greatest hits” (or, I suppose, “greatest misses”) in 
the Court’s long history of failing to treat women as 
 
 169. Marriage Historians Brief, supra note 137, at 7. 
 170. See Ginsburg, supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Case, 
supra note 23. 
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equals to men and its upholding of aspects of the law of 
coverture and of separate spheres ideology.171 While 
some prominent feminist constitutional scholars support 
sex discrimination as a constitutional hook for striking 
down the one man-one woman definition of marriage,172 
they do so not by appealing to “original understanding” 
or “original public meaning” either of marriage or of 
equality. The dissenting opinion by Judge Daughtrey, as 
well as the underlying concurring opinion by Judge 
Berzon, discussed in Part II are instructive. 
D. THE FOUR PRINCIPLES AND REASONED JUDGMENT 
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s method of identifying four 
principles underlying the reason that the right to marry 
is fundamental also evidence a moral reading. In looking 
to such principles the majority rejects Glucksberg, which 
defined “liberty” in a “circumscribed” manner, by 
reference to “specific historical practices.”173 Kennedy 
counters that such an approach is inconsistent with the 
approach used when fundamental rights are at stake, 
such as the right to marry.174 Kennedy cites Loving and 
Lawrence to elaborate on the limits of historical 
practices: “If rights were defined by who exercised them 
in the past, then received practices could serve as their 
own continued justification and new groups could not 
invoke rights once denied.”175 Kennedy further invokes 
Justice Harlan’s method of reasoned judgment and 
rejects the reduction of Due Process to a narrow 
formula. “History and tradition guide and discipline this 
inquiry [of identifying fundamental rights], but do not set 
its outer boundaries.”176 
 
 171. The concurring opinion by Justice Bradley in Bradwell v. State, 83 
U.S. 130 (1873), is a standard text in such presentations of the history of 
the Court’s treatment of women’s status under the Constitution. As noted in 
text, it is similarly cited in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 
 172. Case, supra note 23. 
 173. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 2598. 
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The majority identifies four “underlying principles” 
that demonstrate that “the reasons marriage is 
fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal 
force to same-sex couples.”177 These principles about 
marriage stress both goods and rights; that marriage 
simultaneously has public and private dimensions.178 So, 
too, Justice Kennedy affirms—as one principle—that 
marriage is an institution “at the center” of “many facets 
of the legal and social order”—a “keystone of our social 
order.” Its very centrality makes exclusion from it all the 
more unjust and, to use another term favored by 
Kennedy, “urgent.”179 Taking a page from Goodridge, 
Justice Kennedy stresses that prior transformations of 
marriage in response to newly-perceived injustices have 
strengthened, not weakened it. He concludes that 
respondents have not shown a foundation for concluding 
that allowing same-sex marriage will cause the harmful 
outcomes they predict; while he does not explicitly 
predict the institution will thrive with this new step, he 
certainly, in an allusion to Lawrence, makes clear that 
these new marriages “pose no risk of harm,” including 
to third parties.180 This discussion of what marriage is 
and what its purposes are contrasts sharply with the 
more truncated view offered in Chief Justice Roberts’s 
dissent (and in the Sixth Circuit majority opinion). The 
Obergefell majority observes that, as marriage has 
evolved over time, so too have understandings of its 
purposes. Kennedy’s elaboration of the four principles 
emphasizes rights and their gradual extension to those 
previously excluded, another way in which he offers a 
moral reading of the Constitution. 
 
 177. Id. at 2599. 
 178. In other work, James Fleming and I point out the dual focus on rights 
(to autonomy and self-definition) and moral goods in Goodridge and in the 
California marriage case, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
See JAMES E. FLEMING AND LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013). 
 179.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 180. Id. at 2607. 
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CONCLUSION 
To return to my opening questions: what’s in a 
name? Why do definitions matter? At issue in this 
symposium are the boundaries of competing approaches 
to constitutional interpretation and what the respective 
promise of moral readings and originalisms are for 
controversies like this marriage definition battle. One 
aim of Fleming’s book is to point out that new originalists 
are moving in directions that seem to embrace methods 
that old (and some new) originalists condemned—when 
practiced by moral readers—as out of bounds (pp. 3-19). 
The move to “original meaning” or “original public 
meaning,” for example, seeks to free interpreters from 
being bound by historical applications that were based 
on factual assumptions that later generations (and even 
some at the time) rightly view as incorrect. Certainly, 
feminists are acutely familiar with wrong-headed 
assumptions about women’s capacities and roles and the 
way in which those assumptions have rationalized their 
inequality, over time, in the economic, familial, political, 
and legal spheres. Thus, it is certainly intriguing and 
worth noting when prominent originalist theorists wish to 
champion prohibiting sex discrimination as a proper aim 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if that aim was 
realized tardily. So, too, it was intriguing, as the Court 
considered Obergefell, to learn of the attempts by some 
originalists to make a constitutional “case” for same-sex 
marriage as flowing from the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
original meaning prohibiting class or caste legislation. I 
shall not “rule” on whether these developments fit 
comfortably within a “big tent” originalism181 or whether, 
as Fleming would likely argue, they are better seen as 
the incorporation of moral reading methods, such that 
these originalists should “reconceive their projects as 
being in support of the moral reading”—rather than as 
 
 181. Cf. Lawrence Solum, What Should Count as an Originalist Case for a 
Right to Same Sex Marriage, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/ 
legaltheory/2015/01/what-should-count-as-an-originalist-case-for-a-right-to-
same-sex-marriage.htm. 
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“offering alternatives to it”—and join the moral reading 
big tent (p. 97). As Fleming observes, while “there is no 
hope” of reconciling old originalism—of the sort evident 
in Judge Sutton’s opinion and some of the Obergefell 
dissents—with moral reading, the “prospects for 
reconciliation” of new originalism and moral readings are 
more promising (pp. 48-49). These arguments about 
new appreciation of the proper application of 
constitutional principles as new understandings dawn 
bring to mind the theme of generational and moral 
progress sounded at the end of Lawrence v. Texas and 
echoed in a number of post-Windsor opinions: “As the 
Constitution endures persons in every generation can 
invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.”182 Fittingly, Fleming closes his book with this 
passage, urging citizens, scholars, and judges to be 
moral readers who are mindful that the Constitution 
establishes a “framework for a self-governing people to 
build out over time in light of experience together with 
moral and political learning” (p. 191). 
 
 182. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–89. 
